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Introduction
In an increasingly digital world, it can often feel like numbers define
us. Whether your social security number, your phone number, or your
credit score, the cold truth is that your identity is often boiled down to
a single number. In the financial world, your credit score traditionally
defines your eligibility for credit and the cost of credit, but the uses
of credit scores have expanded to include premiums for insurance,
employment eligibility, and other non-financial determinations.1
Particularly in tough financial times, small fluctuations in credit scores
can have large impacts on consumers’ access to affordable credit.2
As furnishers and credit reporting agencies increasingly send
information to each other electronically and use electronic forms for
error resolution, the human element of the consumer can get lost in the
translation.3 Credit reporting agencies investigate consumer disputes
electronically by using codes to signify complicated and nuanced
challenges to errors on credit reports without paying much attention
to the specific claims made by consumers.4 In a system dominated by
* Catherine Bourque is a graduate of American University, Washington College of Law (May
2014). She first became interested in the consumer credit reporting system as an advocacy associate
at the Consumer Federation of America and has continued her work throughout law school. She
would like to first and foremost thank the Legislation & Policy Brief for this tremendous honor
and for all of their help. She would also like to thank the American University Business Law
Review, which helped her with the initial writing process. A special thanks to Elizabeth Khalil,
Senior Policy Advisor at the FDIC, for her expertise and encouragement.
1
See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Key Dimensions and Processes in the U.S.
Credit Reporting System: A review of how the nation’s largest credit bureaus manage consumer
data, 5 (2012) [hereinafter CFPB Credit Reporting System Report], available at http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_credit-reporting-white-paper.pdf (providing background
on the types of uses for consumer credit reports).
2
See 60 Minutes: 40 Million Mistakes: Is Your Credit Report Accurate?, CBS News (February 10,
2013) [hereinafter 60 Minutes: Is Your Credit Report Accurate?], http://www.cbsnews.com/video/
watch/?id=50140748n (noting that only 44 million Americans checked their free credit reports
through the federal annualcreditreport.com system and 8 million consumers report mistakes to
the three major credit reporting agencies each year).
3
See Making Sense of Consumer Credit Reports Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer
Prot., S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 102th Cong. 32 (2012) [hereinafter Consumer
Credit Reports Hearing] (statement of Chi-Chi Wu, Staff Attorney, National Consumer Law Center),
available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_
id=1b5d9716-9a48-4757-90d8-7a69d33af0ca (observing that consumer documentation about
disputed credit information is not included when disputes are forwarded to furnishers because
the credit reporting bureaus only forward the standardized Metro 2 form).
4
See id. at 32 (reporting that mixing of files often occurs because credit reporting agencies only
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cold numbers, how can consumers defend their reputations and hold
furnishers responsible for errors on their credit reports?
This article addresses whether or not consumers can bring state
claims against data furnishers and how the system can be reformed
to create a more fair and efficient method of resolving credit report
inaccuracies.5 First, this article explains the current regulation of the
credit reporting market and the competing preemption provisions
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Second, using recent case law, this
article analyzes the different methods that courts use to reconcile the
competing provisions of FCRA. Third, this article argues for adoption
of a more inclusive standard, the recklessness standard, for state
claims brought by consumers, particularly because of the industry’s
movement towards electronic dispute resolution systems. Finally, this
article makes recommendations to clarify preemption under the FCRA
and improve the dispute process for consumers, including possible
actions by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and
federal legislation.
I. Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies and
the History of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
Consumer credit reporting agencies are responsible for generating
consumer credit scores, which financial service providers and others
use to determine the credit-worthiness of borrowers.6
Credit reporting agencies rely on information provided by credit
data furnishers, including banks, credit card companies, debt settlement
companies, and other creditors to create a specific credit score for each
consumer.7 The algorithm used to determine the actual credit score
match 7 of 9 digits in social security numbers and do not take sufficient precautions to verify the
identity of consumers).
5
See Federal Trade Commission, Report to Congress Under Section 319 of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003, Federal Trade Commission 54 (2012) [hereinafter FTC Study of Credit
Report Accuracy], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/02/130211factareport.pdf (observing that
it is very hard for consumers to remove inaccuracies from credit reports).
6
See CFPB Credit Reporting System Report, supra note 1, at 3 (finding that the credit reporting
market involves over 200 million consumers, 10,000 data furnishers, and over 1.3 billion consumer
trade lines in their proprietary databases); 60 Minutes: Is Your Credit Report Accurate?, supra note 2
(reporting that credit scores can be used in qualifying for a mortgage or credit card, but also for
employment and insurance purposes). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Warning
to Nationwide Specialty Consumer Reporting Agencies, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protectionbureau-issues-warning-to-nationwide-specialty-consumer-reporting-agencies/ (warning that
specialized consumer credit reporting agencies in different areas like criminal records, rental
histories, checking accounts, employment, and insurance claims are also required to provide
yearly copies of credit reports to consumers).
7
See CFPB Credit Reporting System Report, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining that credit files
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number is protected as a trade secret and can be trademarked.8 The
widespread use of credit scores to determine access and cost of credit,
housing, and even employment decisions makes the accuracy of the
information given to credit reporting agencies critically important for
the financial security of consumers.9
A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
Credit reporting agencies are federally regulated by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA).10 Congress enacted the FCRA in 1970 “to ensure
fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking
system, and protect consumer privacy.”11
The statutory authority of the FCRA used to lie with the prudential
banking regulators and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), but the
Dodd–Frank Act transferred authority to the recently created Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).12 The CFPB now has authority to
supervise and enforce the FCRA for larger participants in the credit
reporting market as well as rulemaking authority for the FCRA.13 The
include accounts in the consumer’s name, often called trade lines; financial information including
bankruptcies, tax liens, and other public record information; and inquiries by businesses into the
credit of the consumer).
8
See generally Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy: An Algorithmic Quagmire or
How the Lack of Transparency in Complex Financial Models Scuttled the Finance Market, 12 U.C. Davis
Bus. L.J. 87 (2011) (detailing how trade secrecy and the lack of transparency in the financial risk
models of credit scoring contributed to the financial crisis in 2008).
9
See CFPB Credit Reporting System Report, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that all parties involved
in the credit reporting system have a vested interest in improving the accuracy and efficiency of
the credit scoring process).
10
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2012) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer
credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the
consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such
information in accordance with the requirements of this subchapter.”).
11
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52–53 (2007) (discussing the standard for a private
right of action under the FCRA). See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
12
Compare Memorandum of Understanding Between the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
and the Federal Trade Commission, available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/01/FTC.
MOUwSig.1.20.pdf (adopting procedures for the FTC and the CFPB to share information and
coordinate enforcement efforts), with Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Reporting
Market, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,874 (July 20, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1090) (establishing
rulemaking and supervisory authority over larger actors in the consumer credit reporting market
pursuant to authority from the Dodd–Frank Act for the CFPB to supervise nonbank financial
service actors). See also Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5301 (2012).
13
See Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Reporting Market, 77 Fed. Reg. at 42,876 (July
20, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1090)(“More than $7 million in annual receipts resulting
from relevant consumer reporting activities. Covered persons meeting the test qualify as larger
participants and are subject to the Bureau’s supervision authority under 12 U.S.C. 5514.”); Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am., 551 U.S. at 70 (noting that there was no guidance from the FTC on the definition of
“willful” in the FCRA).
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FTC has retained some enforcement authority in conjunction with
the CFPB, although only the CFPB has supervisory and rulemaking
authority for the larger participants in the market.14
The FCRA generally outlines procedures and responsibilities of
both the consumer credit reporting agencies and the furnishers of
consumer credit information.15 The statute imposes duties on both the
credit reporting agencies and data furnishers to provide correct credit
information about consumers and to protect personally identifiable
consumer information such as social security numbers.16 The statute also
imposes a duty on furnishers to investigate data disputed by consumers
with credit reporting agencies and includes a private right of action
against credit reporting agencies for failure to properly reinvestigate
disputed information by the credit reporting bureau.17 Currently there
is no private right of action to bring suit against furnishers of credit
information.18
B. FCRA and Preemption
In general, the FCRA preempts state law and protects furnishers
of credit reporting information from liability under section 1681t(b)
(1)(F).19 However, this provision conflicts with section 1681h(e) of the
FCRA, which states that the consumer cannot bring a claim against
a furnisher of credit information “except as to false information
furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.”20
The attempt to reconcile these provisions of the FCRA has resulted in
different interpretations of whether or not state tort claims brought by
consumers for false information provided to credit reporting agencies
are preempted by the FCRA, which would screen data furnishers from
liability.21 Instead consumers will often bring state claims for defamation
See, e.g., Examining the Uses of Consumer Credit Data Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and
Consumer Credit, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 7–8 (2012) (statement of Robert Schoshinski,
Assistant Director, Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, Federal Trade Commission) available
at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ba15-wstate-rschoshinski-20120913.
pdf (testifying that the FTC had recently obtained a consent order against Spokeo, a data broker
that was acting as a credit reporting agency without following the requirements of FCRA).
15
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
16
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 (2012).
17
See Chi Chi Wu & Elizabeth De Armond, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Fair Credit Reporting
401–02 (7th ed. 2010) (stating that private rights of action are not available for most furnisher
violations of the FCRA except when furnishers fail to properly reinvestigate disputed information).
18
See generally Jeffrey Bils, Fighting Unfair Credit Reports: A Proposal to Give Consumers More Power
to Enforce the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 61 UCLA L. Rev. Disc. 226 (2013) (advocating for the
inclusion of a private right of action for consumers against data furnishers).
19
15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F) (2012).
20
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (2012).
21
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (giving consumers a private right of action against furnishers when
furnishers act willfully or recklessly).
14
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against furnishers who refuse to remedy errors in the information
provided to the consumer reporting agency, creating erroneous
reports that hurt their creditworthiness and raise the cost of credit.22
When information on a consumer credit report is disputed, the credit
reporting agency must investigate the complaint.23 Unfortunately, as
discovered in a recent report released by the CFPB, the credit reporting
agencies merely send a standard verification form to the data furnisher
and rely on the reply from the data furnisher as the full extent of their
investigation.24 This sort of error resolution process falls far short of
the required reasonable and fair process that actually results in errors
on consumers’ credit reports being remedied or removed.25 While
consumers have a private right of action under the FCRA against credit
reporting agencies for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation
of disputed information, consumers should also be able to bring
traditional state common law claims.26 Under some court approaches to
preemption, consumers have been able to bring claims, but only if the
furnishers’ actions meet the high standard of willful intent or malice.
1. The Three Approaches Used to Reconcile Preemption of
State Claims Against Data Furnishers Under the FCRA
Courts have traditionally adopted three approaches to reconcile the
competing provisions of FCRA based on different forms of statutory
construction.27 This section introduces the three methods: the total
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) (establishing that furnishers have a duty to provide accurate
information on credit reports); see also Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 17–18
(quoting statements from a judge who expressed frustration that there is no right to private
enforcement against furnishers under FCRA).
23
See CFPB Credit Reporting System Report, supra note 1, at 4 (finding that consumers contacted
consumer reporting agencies approximately 8 million times in 2011 to dispute information on
their credit file).
24
See id. (noting that consumer reporting agencies do not forward consumer information to credit
report furnishers when data is disputed); accord Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at
29 (reporting that credit reporting agencies rely on an automated system for dispute resolution
that reduces complicated reports by consumers to a simple two-digit number before sending the
dispute form to the furnisher for verification, which is automatically accepted).
25
See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Bulletin on the FCRA’s requirement to investigate
disputes and review “all relevant” information provided by consumer reporting agencies
about the dispute (2013) [hereinafter CFPB Bulletin) available at http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/201309_cfpb_bulletin_furnishers.pdf (emphasizing that furnishers are expected to review
all relevant information provided by CRAs during the verification of a complaint); 60 Minutes:
Is Your Credit Report Accurate?, supra note 3 (discovering that credit reporting agencies outsource
consumer dispute resolution to personnel in India and Latin America who do not even have
phones they can use to investigate the information provided by the consumer).
26
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o (2012) (stating that consumers have a private right of action
when the credit reporting agency or furnisher has acted negligently or with malice); see also
Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Destroy Federal Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 49, 57 (2009) (observing that plaintiffs suing large out-of-state
corporations do not stand the same chances of success in federal court as they do in state court).
27
See Chad M. Pinson & John B. Lawrence, FCRA Preemption of State Law: A Guide Through Muddy
22

Vol. 6.1

Legislation & Policy Brief

13

preemption approach, the temporal approach, and the statutory
approach. These approaches are analyzed according to what is best for
the consumer in Part III of this comment.
a. Total Preemption Approach
Under the total preemption approach, courts have applied cannons
of statutory construction to hold that only section 1681t(b)(1)(F) governs
preemption of state claims, meaning that all state claims against
furnishers of credit information are preempted, including claims
against furnishers who have acted with malice or willful intent.28 The
result is that section 1681h(e) essentially becomes irrelevant.29
In part, this approach is predicated on the fact that section 1681t(b)
(1)(F) was added in 1996, after section 1681h(e), meaning that Congress
intended for section 1681t(b)(1)(F) to replace section 1681h(e) in
governing preemption of claims against furnishers.30 District courts
have been using this approach since the section was added to the FCRA
in 1996.31 Recently the popularity of the approach has grown, with the
Seventh and Second Circuits adopting it in 2011.32 While there are split
decisions within the Ninth Circuit, the majority of decisions in the
circuit have adopted the total preemption approach as well.33
The Seventh Circuit was the first circuit court to decide the issue
in 2011. In Purcell v. Bank of America, the court determined that section
1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts state defamation claims for willful and
malicious furnishing of false information to credit reporting agencies.34
The Second Circuit has interpreted the FCRA similarly, holding
Waters, 15 J. Consumer & Commercial L. 47, 50 (2012) (noting that there is little guidance from
circuit courts with regard to the different approaches to reconciling the conflicting preemption
provisions in the FCRA).
28
See id. (advocating for the adoption of the total preemption approach).
29
See Jill A. Conrad, Preemption Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 25 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin.
L. 579, 588 (2006) (noting that the total preemption approach only applies to furnishers and state
claims against credit reporting agencies are not preempted).
30
See Pinson & Lawrence, supra note 27, at 50–51 (calling the total preemption approach the
clearest approach).
31
See Wu & De Armond, supra note 17, at 427 (noting that this approach renders 1681h(e)
superfluous).
32
See Purcell v. Bank of America, 659 F.3d 622, 624–25 (7th Cir. 2011) (relying on cannons of
statutory construction and Congressional intent to adopt the total preemption approach); see also
Macpherson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 665 F.3d 45, 47–48 (2d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2113
(2012) (finding that the reasoning in Purcell was persuasive).
33
Compare Buraye v. Equifax, 625 F. Supp. 2d 894, 899 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (adopting the total
preemption approach), with Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009)
(ruling that Gorman did not survive summary judgment on other grounds).
34
See Purcell v. Bank of America, 659 F.3d 622, 624–25 (7th Cir. 2011) (making an analogy between
the 1996 addition of § 1681t(b)(1)(F) and a lowering of the speed limit).
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that these provisions were not in conflict, holding that preemption of
state law by section 1681t(b)(1)(F) was more inclusive. The court ruled
that a claim for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress for false information furnished to a credit reporting agency
was preempted.35
b. Temporal Approach
The temporal approach limits the application of section 1681t(b)(1)
(F) to after the furnisher has received notice of an error from a credit
reporting agency, meaning that the furnisher is liable for maliciously or
willfully wrong information under state law only before being notified
of the error, but not after.36
Additionally, some courts have created more confusion over this
approach by only recognizing notice of disputed information that is
provided by the credit reporting agency, but not by the consumer.37
The temporal approach has only been used by a few district courts in
Texas, Pennsylvania, and Kansas in recent years, suggesting that the
approach has fallen out of favor.38
c. Statutory Approach
The statutory approach construes the two competing preemption
statutes to mean that state common law claims are covered by section
1681h(e), while state statutes are preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F).39
The courts reason that by excluding two state statutes under section
1681t(b)(1)(F), Congress intended that provision to only apply to
statutes and not the common law.40 This approach has come under fire
for failing to follow statutory cannons of construction.41
See Macpherson, 665 F.3d at 47–48 (affirming the judgment of the district court).
See Conrad, supra note 29, at 593 (acknowledging that the temporal approach does not make
much sense).
37
See, e.g., Wenner v. Bank of Am., NA, 637 F. Supp. 2d 944, 953 (D. Kan. 2009) (holding that
notice of a furnisher providing defamatory information to a debt collector with malice was not
preempted under the qualified immunity provision of the FCRA).
38
See, e.g., Marcum v. G.L.A. Collection Co., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 870, 874 (E.D. Ky. 2008)
(stating that a recent Kentucky decision had changed the trend in the jurisdiction from favoring
the temporal approach to adopting the statutory approach); Wenner, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 953
(recognizing that there is little guidance from circuit courts, but that some cases in the district have
adopted the temporal approach). See Purcell v. Bank of America, 659 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2011)
(observing that courts have followed the Erie doctrine, holding that preemption of state common
law claims is the same as preemption of state statutes).
39
See Conrad, supra note 29, at 593 (explaining that both the statutory approach and the temporal
approach attempt to recognize both preemption provisions of the FCRA, a preferred cannon of
statutory construction).
40
See id. (describing how a consumer’s claim was preempted under the temporal approach).
41
See Purcell, 659 F.3d at 624 (noting that legislative drafting manuals advise against using plural
words so as to avoid confusion between meanings of singular and plural words).
35
36
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In Baker v. General Electric, a woman brought a state defamation
claim against a financial institution for reporting a debt from her
husband’s Lowe’s credit card to the credit reporting agencies on her
account after her husband filed for bankruptcy.42 She reported the
disputed information to the credit reporting agencies, but her credit
continued to be adversely affected and her credit account at Home
Depot was closed as a result.43 The district court held that the case
could continue to trial since section 1681t(b)(1)(F) only applied to state
statutes and the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged willful and malicious
action by the financial institution.44
Similarly, in Carlson v. Trans Union, LLC, the court held that the
subject matter of the claim—the refusal of Verizon to remove erroneous
credit information regarding a Verizon account on a consumer credit
report—was not preempted because the claim was for defamation
and governed by state tort law.45 As further analyzed in Part III of this
article, the statutory approach is the most favorable to consumers.46
2. Circumventing the Issue: Other Approaches to
Section 1681h(e) and Preemption of State Claims
While these three methods are the predominant methods courts use
to reconcile FCRA preemption provisions, some courts have taken an
alternate route by failing to reach the question of whether or not these
provisions are actually in conflict.47 Some examples of these different
methods include interpreting section 1681h(e) as only referring to
credit reporting agencies, and holding that some credit information,
such as medical debts, are not included in furnisher responsibilities.
These debts are therefore not governed by the relevant preemption
provisions.48
For instance, the Fourth Circuit has interpreted the statute in a way
that the qualified immunity provision, section 1681h(e), refers only to
See Baker v. Gen. Elec. Capital, Corp., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1333–34 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (adopting
the statutory approach to preemption under the FCRA).
43
See id. at 1333–34 (holding that the consumer could bring her defamation claim against the
credit card financier).
44
See id. at 1338 (surviving a motion to dismiss).
45
See, e.g., Carlson v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 517, 517 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that the
statutory approach was the most persuasive method for dealing with the competing provisions
of FCRA).
46
See Conrad, supra note 29, at 608 (suggesting that courts should adopt the statutory approach).
47
See, e.g., Ross v. F.D.I.C., 625 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that duties under section 1681s-2
only apply to credit reporting agencies and not to furnishers of credit information).
48
See, e.g., Brown v. Mortensen, 253 P.3d 522, 529 (Cal. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 847 (2011)
(reasoning that the broad savings clause of the FCRA indicated that state law should only be
superseded when in direct conflict with the provisions of FCRA).
42
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credit reporting agencies and therefore has no bearing on furnisher
liability.49 The Fourth Circuit used this interpretation to dismiss
a consumer’s defamation claim against her bank when the bank
erroneously reported a mortgage delinquency in her name.50
Recognizing that FCRA will only preempt state claims closely
resembling the duties and obligations under FCRA, some courts have
allowed state claims on other grounds, such as the privacy of medical
information. For example, in Brown v. Mortensen, the Supreme Court
of California allowed the consumer to bring a claim against a debt
collection agency under the California Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act.51
C. Consumers Can Bring Claims Under Section 1681h(e)
When the Furnisher Acted with Malice or Willful Intent
When state claims are not preempted, consumers still have the
burden of proving that the credit information furnisher acted with
malice or willful intent, as required by the qualified immunity provision
of section 1681h(e).52
In the Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr decision, the Supreme
Court defined ‘willful’ in FCRA, although the holding referred to
the definition of willful under the section 1681n(a) private right of
action.53 The Court held that the meaning of ‘willful’ in section 1681n(a)
relating to the failure to notify consumers of adverse actions included
recklessness, which gives ‘willful’ a broader meaning than just
‘knowing.’54 The Court rejected the arguments of the insurance industry
that ‘willfully’ had to be a ‘knowing’ violation.55 Consumer advocates
lauded the decision as a win against the insurance companies, enabling
more consumers to bring claims against insurance companies who
See Ross, 625 F.3d at 808 (appealing grant of summary judgment to the credit furnisher).
See id. at 815–16 (demonstrating that Ross’s claim would have failed to meet the malice standard
under section 1681h(e), if it had applied).
51
See Brown, 253 P.3d at 529 (reasoning that § 1681s-2 only relates to accurate reporting of credit
information and not to the privacy concerns of medical information disclosed to a third party
without consent of the consumer); see also Wu & De Armond, supra note 17, at 155 (reporting that
other courts in California have refused to allow preemption of claims under the Rosenthal Act).
52
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (2012) (“[E]xcept as to false information furnished with malice or
willful intent to injure such consumer.”).
53
See generally Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) (relating to whether insurance
companies were liable for not sending adverse action notices when rates were increased).
54
See Meghan F. McClure, Adverse Action Notices Under the FCRA: The Supreme Court Provides
Guidance, 12 N.C. Banking Inst. 273, 286 (2008) (specifying that the holding was limited to adverse
actions and insurance companies).
55
See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 551 U.S. at 61–62 (holding that initial insurance rates qualified as
adverse actions under FCRA, requiring disclosure to the consumer).
49
50
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failed to provide adverse action notices.56
This article discusses whether the standard for ‘willful’ adopted
in Safeco extends to the definition of ‘willful’ under section 1681h(e)
and what that standard means for consumers seeking to correct errors
on their credit reports. However, consumers may be more successful
bringing claims under the malice standard than under a recklessness
standard for “willful”.57
The commonly accepted standard for ‘malice’ under section
1681h(e) is defined by the New York Times v. Sullivan case as “ statements
made with [a] high degree of awareness of their probable falsity.”58 In
the case of Meisel v. USA Shade & Fabric Structures Inc., the court held
that malice could be established by both the consumer and the related
company informing the furnisher of the erroneous or fraudulent
information on multiple occasions.59 However, a Fifth Circuit decision
found that the malice standard was not met after the consumer and
Target, an involved third-party, had informed the furnisher that the
information on the consumer’s credit report was erroneous on multiple
occasions.60 As these two competing decisions show, defining the malice
standard can be very fact-dependent and can vary widely based on the
jurisdiction.61 This article recommends adopting a standard of malice
that more accurately reflects changing technology and consumer credit
dispute resolution systems.62
D. When Does a Consumer Bring a State
Defamation Claim Against a Furnisher?
Typically a state defamation claim is brought after a consumer
discovers an error or disputed negative mark on their credit report.63
Deepak Gupta, Supreme Court Decides Fair Credit Reporting Act Cases, Consumer Law and
Policy Blog (Feb. 2, 2013) http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2007/06/supreme_court_d.html
(writing that the decision was good for consumers because a willful violation of the FCRA could
be proved by reckless disregard of the law).
57
See infra note 134.
58
See County Vanlines, Inc. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 383, 391 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (finding that credit information reported before the plaintiff was born did not satisfy the
malice standard).
59
See Meisel v. USA Shade & Fabric Structures Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 481, 488 (N.D. Tex. 2011)
(stating that multiple attempts to contact the furnishers of the incorrect credit information without
results would be sufficient to allege malice).
60
See Morris v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 457 F.3d 460, 471 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the
consumer did not present enough evidence of publishing false statements with reckless disregard
to satisfy the malice standard).
61
See Pinson & Lawrence, supra note 27, at 50 (explaining that it can be hard for consumers to
prove malice).
62
See infra note 145.
63
Compare Wu & De Armond, supra note 17, at 267 (noting that the lack of a private right of
56
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This article utilizes a hypothetical based loosely on facts from a recent
D.C. Circuit Court case to analyze different court approaches and the
impacts these approaches have on consumers’ ability to correct errors
and receive compensation for these errors.64
Suppose a long-time customer of a cable company discontinues
his service and schedules a disconnection and equipment removal
appointment.65 At the appointment, the technician leaves behind the
modem that was rented from the cable company.66 A month later when
the customer calls about receiving his refund, he is informed that he
owes the cable company $220 for the modem.67 He then receives a
demand notice from a debt settlement company for the $220.68 After
returning the modem, he is told by the cable company that his account
balance was corrected. However, this consumer never receives notice of
the correction in writing.69 After calling the debt settlement company,
they stop collection on the debt but never contact the credit reporting
agencies to remove the debt collection notice from the consumer’s
credit report.70 Later that year, the consumer goes to take out a
mortgage and is informed that because the collection for the modem
was still on his credit report, he will have to pay an additional $26,000
on his mortgage.71 The consumer sues the debt collection company for
defamation, among other claims.72 Is his defamation claim preempted
by FCRA? As illustrated below, it depends.73
II. Is the Preemption of State Defamation
Claims Still an Open Question?
Courts, scholars and others have long observed that district courts
have adopted multiple approaches to reconciling FCRA’s preemption
action under FCRA forces consumers to look to state common law claims for remedies against
credit information furnishers), with Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702, 703 (6th Cir.
2009) (holding that lack of actual damages does not preclude consumers from proving statutory
damages in a claim for a willful violation of FCRA).
64
See Himmelstein v. Comcast of the Dist., L.L.C., 908 F. Supp. 2d 49, 51–52 (D.D.C. 2012)
(allowing some claims against the cable provider).
65
See id.
66
See id. (stating that the modem was returned to the cable company before the inquiry for the
refund was made).
67
See id.
68
See id.
69
See id. (allowing the claim to proceed under evidence that three attempts to contact were made).
70
See Himmelstein v. Comcast of the Dist., L.L.C., 908 F. Supp. 2d 49, 51–52 (D.D.C. 2012).
71
See id. (noticing that the consumer was only informed of the inaccuracy after receiving the
required adverse action notice while applying for additional credit).
72
But see id. (observing that defamation was not one of the claims brought by the consumer).
73
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Macpherson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 11-1162, 2012
WL 991419 (Mar. 19, 2012) (stating that the different approaches allow some consumers to recover,
but leaves other consumers with no recourse).
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provisions.74 Since there is no controlling Supreme Court decision
and only a few recent circuit decisions, district courts largely fend for
themselves.75 In general, there are three approaches that district courts
have adopted: the total preemption approach, the temporal approach,
and the statutory approach.76 The total preemption approach, which
does not allow for any state claims, is the most common.77 The rise
in adoption by the circuit courts of the total preemption approach
supports the argument that the law is moving towards recognizing the
total preemption approach as the predominant method of determining
preemption, which calls into question whether the issue is still open for
interpretation by the courts.78
A. Conflicting District Court Decisions:
What Approach is Best for the Consumer?
This section discusses the three methods used to reconcile the
conflicting preemption clauses of FCRA and analyzes which approach
provides consumers with the best ability to seek remedies from data
furnishers for errors on their credit reports. Focusing on decisions after
2006, district courts are still using different methods to decide these
cases.79 However, most district courts since 2006 have adopted the
total preemption approach with a few choosing to use the statutory
approach.80 Unfortunately, the total preemption approach is the least
consumer-friendly approach since it completely preempts all state
claims.81

See Pinson & Lawrence, supra note 27, at 50 (noting that even some circuits have competing
approaches to resolving the conflict).
75
See, e.g., Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting the
disarray of district court decisions in the Ninth Circuit).
76
See Pinson & Lawrence, supra note 27, at 50 (detailing decisions which employ all three of the
different approaches).
77
See id. (advocating for the adoption of the total preemption approach); see also Wu & De
Armond, supra note 17, at 153 (suggesting that because the only two circuit decisions on this issue
have adopted the total preemption approach, district courts will follow their lead).
78
See Pinson & Lawrence, supra note 27, at 51 (arguing that the total preemption approach is best
for businesses).
79
See Wenner v. Bank of Am., NA, 637 F. Supp. 2d 944, 952 (D. Kan. 2009) (stating that the Tenth
Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, nor is there much guidance from other circuits); Weseman
v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., CV 06-1338 ST, 2008 WL 542961 (D. Or. Feb. 22, 2008) (noting
that most district courts in the Ninth Circuit have chosen either the total preemption or statutory
approach, though the total preemption approach is more common).
80
See Chi Chi Wu & Elizabeth De Armond, Fair Credit Reporting 152 (7th ed. Supp. 2012)
(observing that the total preemption approach follows the trend of expanding the scope of
preemption and that courts are also narrowly construing § 1681h(e)).
81
See Conrad, supra note 29, at 593 (observing that since the total preemption approach denies
consumers the ability to bring a claim, it does not support the broad consumer protection purpose
of the FCRA).
74
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1. Total Preemption Approach

The total preemption approach provides an easy fix for courts,
but this silver bullet does little to help consumers trying to rectify
errors on their credit reports. Adopting a “last word wins” method,
the total preemption approach completely ignores section 1681h(e)
and, therefore, the consumer’s ability to bring claims against the data
furnisher.82
As the most commonly used approach, it is important to fully
understand the impact that the total preemption approach has on a
consumer’s access to recourse for incorrect data provided to credit
reporting agencies.83 In the hypothetical posited in Part II(C) of this
comment, recognition of section 1681h(e) would allow the consumer to
bring the question to a trier of fact based on a state claim that the debt
collector had acted with malice or willful intent. Much like the decision
in Purcell, if the court in the hypothetical adopted the total preemption
approach, the consumer would be left without any recourse in state
court because any state law claim would be preempted by section
1681t(b)(1)(F).84 Since FCRA only provides a private right of action
against credit reporting agencies when conducting a reinvestigation
of a disputed entry, consumers who try to bring a state claim are
constrained under the total preemption approach.85 Because no state
claim could go forward under this approach, it would not matter
whether the error was the fault of the data furnisher or whether the
consumer had notified the credit reporting agency or data furnisher
that the information on their credit report was disputed.86
Furthermore, the district courts that have adopted the total
preemption approach have not taken into account certain parts of the
See id. at 588–89 (adding that courts also cite the policy argument that Congress intended to
make sure that furnishers were not subject to different liability in different states).
83
See Pinson & Lawrence, supra note 27, at 51 (advocating that furnishers have only limited
liability for incorrect information to encourage voluntary reporting of credit information to the
credit reporting agencies).
84
Compare Purcell v. Bank of Am., 659 F.3d 622, 624–25 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversing the judgment of
the district court in favor of Bank of America), with Boggio v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 696 F.3d 611,
612–13 (6th Cir. 2012) (remanding the case to the trial court because a reasonable jury could find
that USAA failed to adequately investigate the disputed car loan information on the consumer’s
credit report).
85
See Wu & De Armond, supra note 18, at 267 (observing that consumers can only hold furnishers
accountable for breaches of § 1681s-2(b) obligations when the dispute process has been formally
triggered by the credit reporting agency); see also Meredith Schramm-Strosser, The “Not So” Fair
Credit Reporting Act: Federal Preemption, Injunctive Relief, and the Need to Return Remedies for Common
Law Defamation to the States, 14 Duq. Bus. L.J. 165, 171 (2012) (noting that consumers are denied the
remedy of injunctive relief against credit reporting agencies or furnishers).
86
But see 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2012) (stating that the amount in controversy in federal court is
waived for private rights of action under the statute).
82
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legislative history and theories of statutory construction used in the two
other approaches.87 For instance, adopting this statutory construction
would essentially get rid of section 1681h(e), which is an approach that
the Supreme Court has disfavored.88
The Second and Seventh Circuits definitively decided this issue,
choosing the total preemption approach.89 This suggests that the total
preemption approach is becoming the most common and accepted
approach for reconciling the two preemption clauses, though this
is not good news for consumers.90 Because there is no incentive for
furnishers to correct misinformation on consumer credit reports, the
total preemption approach essentially bars consumers from holding
furnishers liable for knowingly providing wrongful information to
credit reporting agencies.91 Since furnishers are not likely to spend
resources correcting wrong information without the threat of liability,
consumers will have to rely on consumer rating agencies to report the
dispute to the furnisher and to advocate for the removal of mistakes.92
This could create a vicious cycle for the consumer who is simply trying
to fix a mistake on their credit report but does not have any state law
remedy and only the limited ability to bring an FCRA claim.93 Given
the problematic nature of this approach and the unfortunate rise
in its prevalence, the best outcome for the consumer may be either
amending FCRA to allow some state claims against furnishers of credit
information or a Supreme Court decision adopting one of the other
approaches.
See Brown v. Mortensen, 253 P.3d 522, 532 (Cal. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 847 (2011)
(“Senator Bryan assured that the bill ‘tried to only preempt those areas of this law which affect the
operational efficiencies of businesses but do not harm consumers,’ and that it was not intended to
‘preempt States’ rights in the area of liability.’”).
88
See Meisel v. USA Shade & Fabric Structures Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 481, 489 (N.D. Tex. 2011)
(criticizing the total preemption approach as out of line with the cannons of statutory construction
because rendering a part of a statute useless is not a preferred interpretation).
89
See Brown, 253 P.3d at 532 (rejecting the argument that the 1996 Reform Act intended a broader
reading of preemption under § 1681t(b)(1)(f)).
90
See Pinson & Lawrence, supra note 27, at 51 (describing how courts that adopt the total
preemption approach ensure that consumers cannot bring state law claims).
91
See Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 17–18 (advocating that consumers be
given more ability to hold furnishers liable for misinformation by being allowed to get a private
injunction against a furnisher or credit reporting agency); Schramm-Strosser, supra note 85, at
170–71 (arguing that private injunctions should be permissible under the statute).
92
See Purcell v. Bank of Am., 1:09 CV 356, 2010 WL 4955542 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 2010) (stating
that a consumer only has a private right of action under § 1681s-2(b) when the consumer
reporting agency notifies the furnisher of the dispute, but not when the consumer disputes the
information directly with the furnisher); see also 60 Minutes: Is Your Credit Report Accurate?, supra
note 2 (reporting that employees of credit reporting agencies accepted the results of furnisher
investigations of disputed information without question).
93
See Conrad, supra note 29, at 608. (demonstrating that consumers could not hold furnishers
liable under state law even when the furnisher knowingly reported false information to the credit
reporting agency).
87
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2. The Temporal Approach

As noted above, the temporal approach limits the application of
section 1681t(b)(1)(F) to after the furnisher has received notice of an
error from a credit reporting agency. Therefore, the furnisher is liable
for maliciously or willfully wrong information before being notified
of the error, but not after.94 Although the temporal approach manages
to reconcile the two competing provisions so that both have some
affect, it makes little sense that credit information furnishers should be
barred from liability after being informed of an error, but still liable for
some state claims before being informed of the error.95 The temporal
approach is particularly troubling when viewed through the eyes of
the consumer because it grants the furnisher greater protection once
notified of an error, meaning that the furnisher would want to have
the information reported to them to escape liability under this type of
claim.96
A complicating factor in the temporal approach is that some courts
have interpreted the statute so that notice triggering the private right of
action must be given by a credit reporting agency and not a consumer.97
Paradoxically, it is better for the consumer if the court requires notice
from the consumer reporting agency because then only claims that are
brought after notice of the dispute from the credit reporting agency
will be preempted, rather than any claim brought after the consumer
notifies the furnisher of the dispute.98 It is easier and more likely to
contain the specifics of the mistaken information if the consumer
notifies the furnisher of the error rather than relying on the credit
reporting agency to resolve the dispute with the furnisher.
The consumer in the hypothetical would have different challenges
in bringing a successful claim depending on what type of notice was
recognized by the court. Since the consumer in the hypothetical never
See, e.g., Wenner v. Bank of Am., NA, 637 F. Supp. 2d 944, 953 (D. Kan. 2009) (adopting the
temporal approach in accordance with the majority of decisions in that district).
95
See Meisel v. USA Shade & Fabric Structures Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 481, 490 (N.D. Tex. 2011)
(observing that it would be strange for Congress to have intended qualified immunity without
notice, but total immunity after the furnisher was alerted to the false information).
96
But see Wu & De Armond, supra note 17, at 401 (stating that the private right of action against
furnishers kicks in only after notification of the dispute from the credit reporting agency).
97
See Wenner, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 953 (adopting the approach that notice may be provided by the
consumer to the furnisher without preempting the claim); see also Michael R. Guerrero, Disputing
the Dispute Process: Questioning the Fairness of S1681s-2(a)(8) and S1681j(a)(1)(a) of the Fair and
Accurate Credit Reporting Act, 47 Cal. W. L. Rev. 437, 438–39 (2011) (arguing that it is logical for
consumers to dispute the information directly with the furnisher rather than bringing the dispute
to the credit reporting agency).
98
See Wenner, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 953 (holding that consumer’s defamation claim against furnisher
was preempted since the claim occurred after notice of dispute from the consumer).
94

Vol. 6.1

Legislation & Policy Brief

23

communicated directly with the credit reporting agency, there was no
notice to the data furnisher of the disputed information on the credit
report in a jurisdiction that only recognizes notice directly from the
credit reporting agency.99 This means that the consumer could bring
a claim against the data furnisher, which is the debt collector in this
instance.100 Although notice would not be an issue, the consumer would
have a hard time overcoming the malice and willful intent standard in
section 1681(e), making it hard for the consumer to bring a state claim
in the hypothetical. In comparison, if the court took the approach that
notice of the disputed information could be given by the consumer,
the consumer’s claim would be preempted since the harm (the error
on the credit report) occurred after the consumer had notified the debt
settlement company of the cable company’s error for the modem.101 In
short, under either method of interpreting notice, the consumer’s claim
has an uphill battle under the temporal approach.
3. The Statutory Approach
The statutory approach preempts any statutorily based state claims,
but allows common law state claims such as claims for defamation.102
While courts have used different cannons of statutory interpretation
to reach this approach, the most persuasive is that section 1681t(b)(1)
(F) contains two exceptions, both of which are state statutes.103 Since
the provision does not explicitly exclude common law claims in those
states, courts have interpreted Congressional intent to only include
preemption of state statutes and not state common law claims.104 This
approach has primarily been adopted by district courts in Pennsylvania,
Texas, and Kansas, but the Fifth and Third Circuit have not definitely
ruled on this issue.105 Some courts have also moved from the temporal
See, e.g., Tilley v. Global Payments, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1330–31 (D. Kan. 2009) (recognizing
that notice of the dispute may only come from the credit reporting agency and not the consumer).
100
See, e.g., id. (deciding that the consumer can only bring a defamation claim if the consumer
reports the dispute to the credit reporting agency).
101
But see id. at 1330 (reasoning that approval of a debt settlement and received email was enough
to create a issue of material fact about willful violation of the FCRA).
102
See Conrad, supra note 29, at 593 (stating that this approach also attempts to reconcile the two
competing preemption provisions).
103
See Manno v. Am. Gen. Fin. Co., 439 F. Supp. 2d 418, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (adding that the phrase
“shall not apply to any State law in effect on September 30, 1996” also supports the statutory
approach since common law claims cannot go into effect unlike statutes).
104
See Carlson v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 517, 521 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that FCRA
did create a private right of action); see also Manno, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 425 (rejecting the argument
for the total preemption approach that Congress simply forgot about 1681h(e) when amending
FCRA).
105
See Galaz v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., CIV.A. SA-11-CA-0646, 2011 WL 6739612 (W.D. Tex.
Dec. 21, 2011) (observing that many district courts in the Fifth Circuit have declined to adopt
the total preemption approach); see also Meisel v. USA Shade & Fabric Structures Inc., 795 F.
Supp. 2d 481, 488 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (adding that the Fifth Circuit generally recognizes 1681h(e));
99
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approach to the statutory approach.106
Under the statutory approach, a consumer bringing a state claim
for defamation could hold the furnisher liable as long as the consumer
could prove malice or willful intent. In the hypothetical discussed above,
much like the claim in Carlson, the subject matter of the claim that the
debt settlement company had erroneously continued to report the debt
after receiving notice of the error from both the cable company and the
consumer, would be governed by state tort law and not preempted
under the statutory approach.107
The statutory approach also manages to address concerns that
section 1681h(e) is a qualified immunity provision, not a preemption
provision, and, as such, the two provisions should not always be
construed as being in conflict.108 Qualified immunity provides that a
furnisher should be allowed some protections, but only to a certain
level.109 By allowing state common law claims for malice or willful
intent, the statutory approach ensures that section 1681h(e) acts as a
qualified immunity clause and not a preemption clause.110
However, the statutory approach is still problematic for consumers
because it does not allow enforcement of state consumer protection
statutes by consumers.111 Traditionally, state consumer protection laws
have provided much greater protection for consumers than federal
laws.112 State statutes under which consumers could bring a claim
Dietz v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 41 A.3d 882, 887 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (noting that most district
courts in Pennsylvania have adopted the statutory approach); ¶ 52,224 FCRA’s Preemptive Effect
on Pennsylvania Laws Examined, CCH-CCGD P 52224 (C.C.H. 2009), 2009 WL 2691675 (stating that
most district courts in the Third Circuit have adopted the statutory approach).
106
See Marcum v. G.L.A. Collection Co., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 870, 874 (E.D. Ky. 2008) (mentioning
that the Western District Court of Kentucky recently moved from following the temporal approach
to the statutory approach).
107
Supra note 63 (stating that the debt collection agency, the furnisher, never contacted the credit
reporting agencies to notify them that the debt was reported in error despite ceasing collection
on the debt); see also Carlson, 259 F.Supp.2d at 517 (holding that a state defamation claim was not
preempted under the statutory approach).
108
See Mark H. Tyson, State Law Furnisher Liability Claims and the FCRA-the State of Confusion, 63
Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 19, 23 (2009) (arguing that a consumer would be able to show facts to
overcome the qualified immunity provision of 1681h(e), but that there are no facts a consumer
could allege to overcome total preemption).
109
See Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing and Old-Fashioned
Defamation, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 1061, 1117 (2007) (noting that misattribution of data should meet
the recklessness standard under malice and willful intent in 1681h(e)).
110
See id. (reasoning that without private enforcement, data aggregators will not be properly
incentivized to match data with the correct consumer identity).
111
See Conrad, supra note 29, at 593 (observing that consumer protection statutes, such as the
Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law, will be preempted under the statutory approach).
112
C.f. Travis Plunkett, Moving Forward: The Regulatory Structure and Consumer Credit
Protections 7 (Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University ed., 2010) available at http://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/mf10-13.pdf (theorizing that states struggle
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against furnishers effectively provides consumers with a private right
of action, meaning that the state legislature chose to give consumers
the right to enforce a remedy from furnishers for mistakes on credit
reports.113 The statutory approach takes away this decision by the states
to give protection to their citizens.114 This also means that consumers
in California and Massachusetts, the two states whose statutes are
exceptions to section 1681t(b)(1)(F) preemption, are afforded more
remedies than consumers in other states.115 All consumers, regardless
of what state they currently reside in, should be afforded the chance to
seek remedies for errors or misinformation on their credit reports.
Although not as common as the total preemption approach, the
statutory approach provides the best method for recognizing both
competing provisions, ruling in line with the cannons of statutory
construction and providing the best remedy for consumers. However,
the statutory approach could be more inclusive.116
B. Splitting Hairs: Some Courts Have
Declined to Decide the Issue
As discussed above, some courts have adopted a number of
other interpretations and readings of the statute to avoid reaching
the issue of reconciling the two preemption provisions. These courts
have interpreted section 1681h(e) as only referring to credit reporting
agencies and holding that credit information, such as medical debts,
are not included in furnisher responsibilities and are therefore not
governed by the relevant preemption provisions.117 This section
to enforce strict state banking and fair lending laws due to federal preemption for nationally
chartered banks).
113
See Jennifer Mitchell, FCRA Limits Consumer Recourse Against Furnishers of Information, Journal
of Texas Consumer Law, http://www.jtexconsumerlaw.com/V7N2pdf/V7N2fcra.pdf (last visited
Feb. 2, 2014) (stating that the private right of action under 1681s-2(b) is not all-inclusive).
114
See id. (recognizing that the Fifth Circuit is not currently hearing cases on this preemption
issue, leaving district courts without much guidance as to what approach to choose).
115
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F) (2012) (“[W]ith respect to section 54A(a) of chapter 93 of the
Massachusetts Annotated Laws (as in effect on September 30, 1996); or with respect to section
1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect on September 30, 1996)[.])”). But see Robert F.
Brennan, Resolving Remedy and Preemption Issues in Credit Reporting Cases, L.A. Law., December
2009, at 10 (explaining that although Congress explicated excluded the California Consumer
Credit Reporting Agencies Act from preemption, the issue has been continually litigated for the
past decade).
116
See Meisel v. USA Shade & Fabric Structures Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 481, 491 (N.D. Tex. 2011)
(“The statutory approach creates an unequivocal bright-line rule that will foster manageable
judicial administration of these two inconsistent preemption provisions while giving meaning
to both.”).
117
See, e.g., Brown v. Mortensen, 253 P.3d 522, 529 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 847 (2011)
(reasoning that medical privacy laws preclude medical debts from preemption under FCRA); see
also Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 32 (recommending that Congress support
legislation removing medical debts from consumer credit reports as these debts are not predictive
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discusses the legal merits of these interpretations and determines how
these different approaches affect consumers’ ability to remedy errors
on their credit reports.
1. Pretending There Is No Conflict
Some courts have even suggested that there is no statutory conflict to
resolve and therefore declined to decide the issue.118 The Fourth Circuit
adopted this approach in Ross v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
reasoning that section 1681h(e) only applies to credit reporting
agencies because section 1681h(e) regards disclosures of negative
information. The court argued, WaMu (the furnisher) was neither a
credit reporting agency, nor did it use Ross’ credit report to deny her
credit.119 However, the Ross decision fails to take into account part of
the statutory language of section 1681h(e) that specifically references
furnishers of credit information when they make disclosures subject to
section 1681g, section 1681h, or section 1681m of the statute.120 The plain
language of the statute makes it clear that section 1681h(e), the qualified
immunity provision, does apply to furnishers of credit information
and that the Ross court’s reasoning is unpersuasive.121 Much like the
total preemption approach, this reading of the statute does not benefit
consumers because it does not allow consumers to bring a state claim
against furnishers for willful or malicious furnishing of information
since section 1681h(e) only applies to credit reporting agencies.122
2. Furnisher Responsibilities and Medical Debt
Some courts, such as the Supreme Court of California, have
declined to reach the issue because section 1681s-2, the section of the
FCRA that details the specific responsibilities of furnishers of credit
information, does not cover the issue in dispute.123 The court in Brown
of the consumer’s creditworthiness).
118
See Islam v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 432 F. Supp. 2d 181, 194 (D. Mass. 2006) (“The Court,
therefore, thinks it quixotic to tilt at these windmills of supposed statutory conflict. Perhaps this
be error. If so, might some circuit court shed light on the issue after all these years?”).
119
See Ross v. F.D.I.C., 625 F.3d 808, 808 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that reporting by bank to the credit
reporting agencies did not fall into the scope of § 1681h(e), and, therefore, the consumer’s claim
was preempted); accord Spencer v. Nat’l City Mortg., 831 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2011)
(deciding that the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning was persuasive and adopting this interpretation).
120
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (2012) (“[W]ith respect to the reporting of information against any
consumer reporting agency, any user of information, or any person who furnishes information to
a consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant to section 1681g, 1681h,
or 1681m of this title[.]”).
121
See Wu & De Armond, supra note 17, at 428–29 (advising that practitioners may have to advise
the court that source of the disclosure does not exclude the wrongdoer from liability under the
qualified immunity provision).
122
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e).
123
See Brown v. Mortensen, 253 P.3d 522, 529 (Cal. 2011),) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 847 (2011)
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reasons that if a state defamation claim arose out of a medical debt,
that issue was not covered by a furnisher’s responsibilities as delegated
under section 1681s-2, and, therefore, is not preempted.124 Under this
reasoning, any state claim arising out of a medical claim that met the
malice or willful intent bar, per section 1681h(e), could be brought in
state court regardless of section 1681t(b)(1)(F).125
Take the consumer in the hypothetical. Since his debt does not
relate to any private information, such as medical history under
HIPPA, according to Brown, the claim would probably be preempted.126
However, if the debt involved a medical bill, the consumer would have
a remedy in state court because the medical debt is not covered under
the furnisher’s responsibilities and not in conflict with the FCRA.127
While consumers should be afforded additional privacy protections
for personal medical information, the subject matter of the debt should
not determine whether or not the consumer has a state claim against a
furnisher for an error on their credit report.128
C. Defining Malice and Willful Intent Under Section 1681h(e)
This section focuses on how section 1681h(e) permits defamation
claims when the data furnisher acts “with malice or willful intent to
injure such consumer.”129 The standards of intent and proof for both
willful intent and malice must be examined to understand when a
consumer can bring a successful state claim against a data furnisher if
not preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F).
1. Does the Definition of Willful in Safeco
Change the Preemption of State Defamation
Claims Under Section 1681s-2(b)?
As discussed above, the Safeco decision held that the meaning of
willful in § 1681n(a) relating to failure to notify consumers of adverse
(discussing that § 1681s-2 only relates to furnisher duty to report accurate information and
furnisher duty in resolving disputed consumer information).
124
See id. (reasoning that the legislative history does not show that Congress intended for the
FCRA to preempt medical privacy laws).
125
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (2012).
126
See Brown, 253 P.3d at 530 (noting that Congress intended privacy laws to be treated specially
in regards to preemption).
127
C.f. Wu & De Armond, supra note 80, at 155–56 (noting that other California courts have
endorsed this interpretation of FCRA, allowing claims under the Rosenthal Act as well).
128
But see Fact Sheet 6a: Facts on FACTA, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse (Feb. 1, 2013), https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-facta.htm#7 (explaining that
medical information could be used against consumers when applying for jobs or refinancing a
mortgage, creating serious privacy implications).
129
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e).
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actions included recklessness, which gives willful a broader meaning
than just knowing.130 The definition of willful is only relevant in
interpretations of the statute that allow claims under section 1681h(e).131
If courts adopt the Safeco definition of willful in section 1681h(e),
what will that mean for consumers? First, it means that any decisions
predicated on willful violations requiring notice would no longer
be relevant. Since willful would encompass recklessness, the notice
requirement needed for knowing, would not be necessary to reach the
willful standard necessary to bring the claim under section 1681h(e).
For the statutory approach, this would mean that any state common
law claim could reach the willful standard simply by the data furnisher
adopting a categorical approach that allows for too many errors
reported to consumer reporting agencies.132 For instance, a practice or
policy adopted by a data furnisher that used an electronic system that
continually provided wrong information, such as wrong social security
numbers, and did not properly verify the information, could reach the
level of reckless and subject the furnisher to liability.133 For the temporal
approach, since the consumer is only allowed to bring claims before the
furnisher has been notified, the inclusion of reckless might encompass
more claims, but is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the ability
of consumers to bring a claim against the furnisher.134
2. A Lower Barrier: Defining Malice Under Section 1681h(e)
Although consumers have a hard time bringing a successful claim
that the data furnisher acted with willful intent, consumers may have
an easier time proving that the furnisher acted with malice.135 As noted
above, the malice standard focuses on a high probability of falseness,
but the actual definition varies between jurisdictions and is largely fact
See McClure, supra note 54, (describing the general holdings of the decision).
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (does not apply to the total preemption approach); see also Conrad, supra
note 29 (reasoning that the definition of willful is only relevant in relation to courts that have
adopted the statutory or temporal approach as § 1681h(e) is subsumed by § 1681t(b)(1)(F) in the
total preemption approach).
132
See Ramirez v. Midwest Airlines, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1169 (D. Kan. 2008) (willful
standard based on reckless disregard of statutory duties rather than harm).
133
See Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 32 (arguing that debt buyers in particular
are not credible sources for verifying disputed consumer credit data); see also De Armond, supra
note 109, at 1126 (detailing that the electronic data verification system used by the credit reporting
agencies is impersonal and makes it difficult to prove intent by furnishers); Guerrero, supra note
97, at 438–39 (illustrating that the dispute system is broken, in part because consumers can only
access their credit reports for free once a year to check for inaccuracies and to see if mistakes have
been rectified).
134
See De Armond, supra note 109, at 1117 (indicating that the 2003 amendments to FCRA did
little to give consumers actual power to seek remedies from furnishers).
135
See Pinson & Lawrence, supra note 27, at 50 (observing that willful intent cannot be claimed
in cases of negligence).
130
131
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dependent.136 Flexible courts, such as the court in Meisel, will recognize
multiple attempts to get disputed information removed without
success as sufficient evidence of malice, meaning that the lucky and
diligent consumers may be able to prove malice.137 In the hypothetical
posited above, since the consumer contacted the cable company three
times, as well as the debt settlement company, the consumer might
be able to meet the malice standard, depending on the case law in
the jurisdiction.138 However, unlike the situation in Morris v. Equifax
Information Services, LLC, where the company that referred the debt,
Target, helped the consumer contest the erroneous information with
the furnisher, the cable company did not seem overly concerned with
helping the consumer.139 It is likely that consumers face a similar level
of apathy from other large corporations.140 Furthermore, even with the
cooperation of Target, the court in Morris still held that the furnisher’s
actions were not malicious.141
Setting a high standard for malice, particularly one that requires “a
high degree of awareness” will result in little opportunity for consumers
to hold furnishers responsible for erroneously reported information.142
Much like willful intent, malice should incorporate a standard of
recklessness, especially since most consumer information furnished to
credit reporting agencies is reported through digital data aggregators.143
Since data is no longer reviewed by an employee sitting at a desk and
looking at a paper copy of the consumer credit report, the courts’
understanding of when the furnisher knows or reasonably should know
that data is incorrect needs to be updated to incorporate a recklessness
standard.144 Providing a meaningful standard for consumers to hold
See supra notes 58–60.
See Meisel v. USA Shade & Fabric Structures Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 481, 490 (N.D. Tex. 2011)
(granting removal of the case to state court).
138
See supra note 63 (stating that the consumer contacted the cable company three times and even
contacted the debt settlement company); see also Himmelstein v. Comcast of the Dist., L.L.C., 908
F. Supp. 2d 49, 51–52 (D.D.C. 2012).
139
See Morris v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 457 F.3d 460, 471 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that Equifax
did not knowingly publish false information about Morris even though the consumer made
multiple contacts with Equifax regarding the disputed information).
140
See Guerrero, supra note 98, at 460 (reasoning that it logical for consumers to go lodge
complaints about disputed credit information with the furnisher, if they know who the furnisher
is, but that by lodging the dispute, the consumer is essentially denying themselves recourse).
141
See, e.g., Morris, 457 F.3d at 471 (refusing to accept Equifax’s argument that the furnisher had
the responsibility to investigate the dispute because the furnisher owned the consumer’s file and
was also a credit reporting agency under the FCRA definition).
142
See Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 32 (arguing that consumers should be
able to order credit reporting agencies and furnishers to fix errors on their credit reports or get an
injunction against the credit reporting agency).
143
See De Armond, supra note 110, at 1126 (acknowledging that courts rely on antiquated
technology and systems to determine notice).
144
See id. (arguing that courts need to apply the recklessness standard in light of modern digital
136
137
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furnishers responsible for misinformation, fuzzily matched records or
other problems will incentivize furnishers to develop better matching
systems and will protect the interests of the state in providing common
law remedies for claims such as defamation.145
III. Methods to Improve Consumer Remedies Under the FCRA
Consumer credit reporting is a complex and multi-faceted market
riddled with opportunities for errors.146 While furnishers and credit
reporting agencies should be provided some protection from liability
for every little error, adopting practices and approaches to dispute
resolution that completely ignore consumers’ complaints and efforts
to remedy errors is out of sync with the purpose of the FCRA and does
little to incentivize data furnishers to improve the accuracy of these
systems.147 Courts have failed to settle on one answer to this preemption
issue.148 Not only do these different approaches create confusion, but
none of these approaches provide an effective fix to reconciling the
two preemption provisions. Whether through the courts, action by the
CFPB, or Congressional action, there is a need for consumers to defend
their reputations and hold furnishers responsible for errors.149
A. Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorari
The Supreme Court should decide this issue because the conflicting
decisions create confusion on an issue of importance to all consumers,
businesses who use credit reports, data furnishers, and the credit
reporting agencies.150 A Supreme Court decision would create a
technology, rather than older, analog processes).
145
See De Armond, supra note 110, at 1119 (recognizing that states have a strong interest in
providing their citizens with remedies under the FCRA); see also Guerrero, supra note 98, at
455 (recognizing that it costs furnishers about thirty cents to handle each disputed item on a
consumer’s credit report).
146
See FTC Study of Credit Report Accuracy, supra note 5, at 35–36 (reporting that 26 percent of
study participants contained at least one error on their credit reports and that one in ten had a
material error on their report); see also CFPB Credit Reporting System Report, supra note 1, at 19
(illustrating that the consumer credit reporting agencies often reject consumer trades lines from
furnishers due to inconsistencies and anomalies in the data and that data from collection agencies
tends to get rejected more often than data from other furnishers).
147
See Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 16 (observing that before the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau was granted authority over the credit reporting, market forces did
little to incentivize credit reporting agencies or furnishers to improve their reporting system and
that the only incentive came from consumers willing to bring a private enforcement action).
148
See Tyson, supra note 108, at 20 (providing a summary of the different approaches).
149
See Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 16 (recommending that Congress take
several actions, including granting consumers the right to an injunction against credit reporting
agencies, and prohibiting medical debt from being included on a consumer credit file).
150
See McClure, supra note 54, at 283 (noting that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Safeco
because of the importance of class action suits under the FCRA to both consumers and lenders);
see also David D. Schein & James D. Phillips, Holding Credit Reporting Agencies Accountable: How the
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national standard, which would lower regulatory and litigation costs
for data furnishers.151 Furthermore, if the Supreme Court adopted the
statutory approach, consumers would have a better chance of getting
errors removed from their credit reports and receiving recompense for
injuries resulting from the error.152 As discussed above, the statutory
approach allows for consumers to bring some state common law claims
against furnishers for erroneous credit information provided to credit
reporting agencies and is the best approach for consumers.
B. New Cop, New Powers: Ways the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Could Fix the Preemption Issue in FCRA
The CFPB has a chance to affect change in the credit reporting
market, specifically on the issue of furnisher liability, given the new
powers granted the fledgling agency under Dodd–Frank.153 Specifically,
Dodd–Frank gave the CFPB rulemaking and supervisory authority
for the major actors in the credit reporting market.154 Additionally,
since many furnishers of credit information are financial institutions,
both bank and non-bank, such as debt collectors, the CFPB also has
purview over many of the furnishers.155 The CFPB has shown an
interest in working to improve the credit reporting market, issuing
supervisory guidelines for larger participants in the credit reporting
market, conducting a study on management of consumer data by
the credit reporting agencies, including error resolution, and even
issuing a bulletin to alert furnishers of the need to fully and accurately
investigate consumer complaints referred to the furnisher from the
credit reporting agencies.156
Financial Crisis May Be Contributing to Improving Accuracy in Credit Reporting, 24 Loy. Consumer L.
Rev. 329, 339 (2012) (observing that there has been a sharp rise in FCRA litigation with the advent
of the Internet and websites such as freecreditscore.com, which portends that a high volume of
FCRA litigation will continue in the future).
151
Accord Pinson & Lawrence, supra note 27, at 50 (explaining that the purpose of the FACT Act
was, in part, to lower costs for furnishers by creating a national standard for liability).
152
See Conrad, supra note 29, at 608 (noting that the statutory approach is also the most consistent
with cannons of statutory interpretation as well as the consumer protection goal of the statute).
153
Compare Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 12 (detailing that the CFPB has
greater authority over the credit reporting market than the FTC ever did), with Examining the Uses
of Consumer Credit Data Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Instit. and Consumer Credit, H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., supra note 14, at 7–8 (describing how the FTC plans on working with the CFPB to bring
enforcement actions against bad actors in the consumer credit reporting market).
154
See generally Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Reporting Market, 77 Fed. Reg.
42874 (authority granted in Title X of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act).
155
See id. (reporting that the CFPB had supervisory authority over larger actors in the credit
reporting market as of September 30, 2012).
156
See CFPB Credit Reporting System Report, supra note 1, at 2 (observing that the CFPB
had already begun the examinations process for the larger participants in the credit reporting
market); CFPB Bulletin, supra note 25 (“The CFPB will continue to evaluate compliance with
the requirement to review ‘all relevant information’ by furnishers subject to its supervisory and
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While the CFPB cannot require courts to hold credit information
furnishers liable for errors on a consumer’s credit report, there are
several ways that the CFPB could help consumers make sure that errors
or disputed information is removed in a timely and straightforward
manner.157 One way for the CFPB to aid consumers in fixing these errors is
to bring enforcement actions against furnishers for reporting inaccurate
information in violation of the FCRA such as the enforcement action
against American Express.158 This will incentivize furnishers to adopt
good dispute resolution systems and also provide reimbursement to
consumers for any harm, such as the $85 million that was returned to
consumers in the American Express settlement.159 Another way that the
CFPB could address this problem is by issuing a rule that requires credit
reporting agencies to automatically remove any disputed information
pending further investigation by the credit reporting agency and the
furnisher of the disputed information, which is not current practice.160
By requiring that disputed information be removed, consumers will be
able to get errors removed from their reports quickly and furnishers
and credit reporting agencies will want to have adequate procedures in
place for prevention and efficient investigation of errors.161
Given the mission and structure of the CFPB, enacting some of
the changes discussed above would be the most straightforward and
fastest way to amend the dispute resolution process in consumer credit
reports.162
enforcement authorities.”).
157
See, e.g., Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 36 (recommending that the CFPB
issue regulations requiring certain accuracy and dispute resolution processes for credit reporting
agencies).
158
See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Orders American Express to Pay $85
Million Refund to Consumers Harmed by Illegal Credit Card Practices (2012),) available
at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/cfpb-orders-american-express-to-pay85-million-refund-to-consumers-harmed-by-illegal-credit-card-practices/
(announcing
that
American Express failed to report consumer disputes of credit information to the credit reporting
agencies in violation of FCRA).
159
See, e.g., id. (relating that American Express was also required to pay a civil monetary penalty
of $27.5 million).
160
See Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 16 (observing that credit reporting agencies
overly report negative information).
161
See Edward Thrasher, The Fair Credit Reporting Act: Deficiencies and Solutions, 21 Temp. Pol.
& Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 599, 615 (2012) (“Of course, the optimal standard for consumers would be
the opposite: if there is a chance that the information is incorrect, it should be removed until
reinvestigated for accuracy.”); see also Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 16 (arguing
that current market forces do not adequately encourage credit reporting agencies to ensure that
information on consumer credit reports is accurate or to conduct a sufficient investigation of
disputed information).
162
C.f. 60 Minutes: Is Your Credit Report Accurate?, supra note 2 (reporting that FTC Commissioner
Leibowitz thought that the study results of twenty percent for any error and ten percent for a
material error on consumer credit reports was not an acceptable error rate).
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C. Legislative Fixes to Credit Reporting Error Resolution
As discussed above, Congressional intent as to the reconciliation of
the two preemption provisions remains a matter for interpretation.163
However, only Congress has the power to amend the FCRA and make
clear Congressional intent.164 As evidenced by recent Congressional
hearings, Congress continues to monitor the consumer credit reporting
market.165
One way that Congress could fix this issue and provide much
needed protection for consumers is to amend the FCRA to strengthen
the private right of action for consumers who have errors on their credit
reports, especially by allowing consumers to get an injunction against
furnishers and credit reporting agencies.166 Another is to incorporate
recklessness into the standard of malice or willful intent necessary for
the consumer to bring a claim under section 1681h(e).167 This lower
standard, similar to the definition of willful intent adopted in Safeco,
would enable consumers to more easily bring state claims while
maintaining a high enough bar to protect furnishers from frivolous
claims.168 Congress has an interest in establishing a working consumer
credit reporting market that balances responsibility and efficiency for
the actors in the marketplace.169 Congress should take action beyond
simply holding hearings and give states some discretion in providing
See Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 18 (observing that this confusion leads to
furnishers being insulated from liability even in cases of extreme negligence).
164
See, e.g., Blake Ellis, Bill seeks to erase medical debt from credit reports, CNN Money (Aug. 1,
2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/01/pf/medical_debt_credit_report/#sthash.6TGPfp7O.dpuf
(explaining that a proposed bill in the Senate would amend the FCRA to require credit reporting
agencies to remove medical debt within 45 days of the debt being paid).
165
See Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 19 (recommending that Congress amend
FCRA to give consumers more power to hold furnishers liable as the current system does not
support rigorous enough investigation of disputed credit information).
166
See Schramm-Strosser, supra note 85, at 170–71 (advocating that consumers be allowed to bring
injunctions against credit reporting agencies after the reinvestigation of disputed information has
failed to provide a remedy); see also Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 19 (testifying
that the National Consumer Law Center supports providing consumers the right to ask a court to
fix errors on their credit reports when the dispute resolution process has failed).
167
See Thrasher, supra note 161, at 610–11 (arguing that if the FCRA raised the burden for
investigation of consumer disputes by credit reporting agencies, it would also make it easier for
consumers to prove willful negligence); see also De Armond, supra note 109, at 1126 (detailing that
the electronic data verification system used by the credit reporting agencies is impersonal and
makes it difficult to prove intent by furnishers).
168
Compare Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 30 (explaining that the credit reporting
agency does not need to act as a small claims court to transfer the burden of proof in disputes
from the consumer to the furnisher), with Pinson & Lawrence, supra note 27, at 51 (reasoning that
Congress intended for furnishers to be somewhat isolated from liability to encourage reporting of
credit information to credit reporting agencies).
169
See Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 19 (showing that Congress should amend
the FCRA to enable a more accurate credit reporting system by giving consumers the power to
get injunctive relief).
163
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consumer protections to their citizens.170
Conclusion
The name and purpose of the Fair Credit Reporting Act calls for the
protection of the consumer and the establishment of an efficient and
fair system in the consumer credit reporting market.171 Credit reports
have an unequivocal importance to the cost of credit and the financial
security of consumers.172 There is little question that the current system
places the burden on consumers to prove errors on their credit reports
and to get these errors fixed.173 However, consumers are the least able
to remedy these errors, having neither the expertise nor the time and
money to remain diligent about their credit reports. The current burdens
and incentives in the credit reporting market need to be brought into
line with the stated goal of the FCRA and enable consumers to hold
furnishers that provide misinformation responsible for their actions.
While fixing two small provisions within the FCRA may seem like an
inconsequential step, shifting some responsibility to furnishers for their
wrong actions starts to shift incentives.174 In light of the financial crisis
and the automation of handling consumer disputes, Congress, federal
agencies, and the courts should decide how to reconcile these two
preemption provisions, keeping in mind that a fair and efficient system
will take into account the incentives and burdens for both furnishers
and consumers.

See id. (observing that FCRA is an outlier in respect to the consumer’s ability to get injunctive
relief under California law, which Congress should change).
171
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2012) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer
credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the
consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such
information in accordance with the requirements of this subchapter.”). See supra note 10.
172
See CFPB Credit Reporting System Report, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that credit reports and
credit scores play a critical role in determining the cost of credit for consumers).
173
Compare Consumer Credit Reports Hearing, supra note 3, at 30 (explaining that the credit reporting
agency does not need to act as a small claims court to transfer the burden of proof in disputes
from the consumer to the furnisher), with Pinson & Lawrence, supra note 27, at 51 (reasoning that
Congress intended for furnishers to be somewhat isolated from liability to encourage reporting of
credit information to credit reporting agencies).
174
See Thrasher, supra note 161, at 610–11 (noting that small changes in the FCRA would
significantly help consumers).
170

